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In this paper we construct a stochastic overlapping-generations general equilibrium model in which
households are subject to aggregate shocks that affect both wages and asset prices. We use a calibrated
version of the model to quantify how the welfare costs of severe recessions are distributed across different
household age groups. The model predicts that younger cohorts fare better than older cohorts when
the equilibrium decline in asset prices is large relative to the decline in wages, as observed in the data.
Asset price declines hurt the old, who rely on asset sales to finance consumption, but benefit the young,
who purchase assets at depressed prices. In our preferred calibration, asset prices decline more than
twice as much as wages, consistent with the experience of the US economy in the Great Recession.
A model recession is approximately welfare-neutral for households in the 20-29 age group, but translates
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The current economic downturn is the most severe since the Great Depression. Household incomes
have fallen signicantly below trend, and the prices of real estate and stocks have plummeted. The
goal of this paper is to explore the welfare consequences of a severe and long-lasting recession that
results in large declines in wages and a collapse in asset prices. Our main objective is to study how
these welfare costs vary across dierent age cohorts.
There are good reasons to believe that the welfare eects of large aggregate shocks are unevenly
distributed across dierent generations. Young households have little nancial wealth, relative to
their labor income, while older households are asset-rich but have little human wealth, measured
as the present discounted value of future labor income. In addition, young households who buy
assets at depressed prices gain from future asset price appreciation, while older households close
to the end of their life cycle cannot wait for prices to recover. Thus it is likely that a steep decline
in asset prices has more serious welfare implications for older households.
In the next section, we use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to document how the
ratio of labor income to net worth varies over the life cycle. We then estimate the magnitude of the
declines in net worth associated with the current recession, focussing on how these losses vary with
the age of a household. To do so we decompose net worth into dierent types of assets and debts,
and estimate losses by applying asset-class specic price deators to age-group-specic portfolios.
We nd that the average household experienced a decline in net worth of $177,000 between the
middle of 2007 and the trough of the asset price decline in the rst quarter of 2009. These
losses were heavily concentrated among older age groups: households aged 60-69 lost $312,000 on
average. Since 2009, asset prices and net worth have recovered somewhat, but remain well below
their 2007 values.
These empirical facts suggest that the welfare losses from large economic downturns are un-
evenly distributed across dierent age cohorts in the population. However, a more complete welfare
analysis requires forecasts for the future evolution of labor income and asset prices, and an under-
standing of how agents will optimally adjust savings and portfolio choice behavior in response to
expected future wage and price changes. In the remainder of the paper we therefore construct a
stochastic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations in which households of dier-
ent ages are subject to large aggregate shocks that aect both wages and asset prices. We use
a realistically calibrated version of the model to assess the distributional consequences of severe
recessions. One question of particular interest that we can ask within the context of this model is
1whether young people might actually be better o if they become economically active in the midst
of a large and persistent economic downturn.
The answer to this question crucially depends on the size of the decline in equilibrium asset
prices, relative to the decline in income, in response to a negative aggregate shock. If middle-
aged households have a strong incentive to sell their assets in the downturn (e.g., because they
strongly value smooth consumption proles) then asset prices decline more strongly than income
in equilibrium. This in turn benets younger generations who buy these assets at low prices,
compensating for the fall in earnings they experience. At the same time, we will present evidence
that younger households experience disproportionately large earnings losses in recessions. Thus
the overall allocation of welfare losses from a recession will depend on the quantitative importance
of age dierences in exposure to asset price risk relative to age dierences in the direct eect of
recessions on labor incomes.
To quantify the relative importance of these osetting eects, we rst compute welfare eects
under the assumption that recessions are age-neutral in the sense that earnings decline proportion-
ately for all age groups. We then extend the model to allow for the age prole of earnings to tilt
during a recession, in disfavor of younger age groups. In our preferred calibration, we nd that the
asset price eect dominates, such that deep recessions are associated with massive welfare losses
for older households and virtually no losses for the young. In an alternative version of the model
that endogenizes household portfolio choice and that generates larger asset price movements, the
youngest age group actually enjoys higher lifetime utility if they become economically active during
a recession.
Our paper builds upon and contributes to three broad strands of the literature. First, we use
a large-scale overlapping generations (OLG) model with aggregate risk to study the asset pricing
and intergenerational consumption implications of large aggregate shocks. The literature that
analyzes asset prices and portfolio choice in stochastic OLG economies includes Labadie (1986),
Human (1987), R os-Rull (1994), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004, 2007), Constantinides,
Donaldson, and Mehra (2002), and Kubler and Schmedders (2010). R os-Rull (1996) investigates
the properties of business cycles in this class of models, while Ball and Mankiw (2007), Smetters
(2006), Krueger and Kubler (2004, 2006), Miyazaki, Saito, and Yamada (2009), and Campbell and
Nosbusch (2007) analyze the allocation of aggregate consumption risk across dierent generations.
Second, whereas we focus on the impact of shocks to aggregate output, a number of papers
study the distributional consequences across age cohorts of other types of large economy-wide
2shocks. Our analysis is similar in spirit to Doepke and Schneider (2006a,b)'s study of the inationary
episode of the 1970's and, to a lesser extent, to Meh, R os-Rull, and Terajima (2010). A number of
studies employ OLG models to investigate the impact of large swings in the demographic structure
of the population on factor and asset prices, as well as on the welfare of dierent age cohorts.
Examples include Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante (2007), Krueger and Ludwig (2007), and R os-Rull
(2001).
Finally, a recent literature estimates empirical models of aggregate consumption that allows for
large declines in aggregate consumption (so-called disasters) and uses these estimates in consump-
tion based asset pricing models. See, e.g., Barro (2006, 2009), and Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro,
and Ursua (2010).1
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present life cycle facts
on labor income, net worth, and portfolio allocations that motivate our quantitative analysis and
that we use later to calibrate the model. In Section 3 we set up our model and dene a recursive
competitive equilibrium. In Section 4 we analyze a sequence of simple examples that can be
characterized analytically and that provide important insights into the key mechanism of the model.
Section 5 is devoted to the calibration of the model, and Sections 6 and 7 report the ndings from
our model economies, for the cases in which aggregate shocks do not, and do, aect the shape
of the age-earnings prole, respectively. Section 8 concludes. Details about the computational
approach, proofs, and additional theoretical results are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Data
In this section we document the life-cycle proles for labor income, net worth, and portfolio com-
position that motivate our focus on heterogeneity along the age dimension and will serve as inputs
for the calibration of the model. The need for detailed data on household portfolios leads us to
use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF is the best source of micro data on the
assets and debts of U.S. households. One advantage of the survey is that it over-samples wealthy
households, using a list based on IRS data. Because the SCF weighting scheme adjusts for higher
non-response rates among wealthier households, it delivers higher estimates for average income
than other household surveys, such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) or Panel Study of
1The latter paper nds that (on average) aggregate consumption falls by 11% during a disaster period, that
a large part of these consumption drops are reversed in the long run (i.e., there is only a small eect of the
consumption disaster on the long-run trend of consumption), and that the average length of a disaster period is
6.5 years. Our calibration will imply a consumption process broadly consistent with these ndings.
3Income Dynamics (PSID). The survey is conducted every three years, with the most recent survey
conducted in 2007, around the peak in asset prices.
We use the SCF to construct life-cycle proles for labor income, total income, assets, debts,
and net worth (see Table 1). These proles are constructed by averaging (using the SCF sample
weights) across households partitioned into 10-year age groups. We divide total income into an
asset-type income component, and a residual non-asset-income component which we call labor
income.2 We make two adjustments relative to the SCF concept of household income. First, we
add an imputation for implicit rents accruing to home owner-occupiers and attribute these rents
to asset income.3 Second, we subtract interest payments on debts, thinking of these as a negative
component of asset income. We measure net worth as the value of all nancial and non-nancial
assets, less the value of all liabilities. Our SCF-based measure of net worth excludes the present
value of future pensions associated with dened benet private pension plans and social security.
In 2007 average household income in the SCF was $83,430, while average household net worth
was $555,660, for a net worth to income ratio of 6.66.4 Average household assets amounted to
$659,000, with an average rate of return of 3.1%. Average household debts came to $103,300,
with an average interest rate on debts of 6.4%. The share of net asset income in total income
was 0.16. Young households had negative net asset income, despite having positive net worth,
reecting the higher average interest rate paid on debts relative to the rate earned on assets.
Figure 1 plots the life-cycle proles for labor income and net worth. Income follows the fa-
miliar humpshape over the life cycle, while net worth peaks somewhat later. For 20-29 year olds,
average net worth is 1.9 times average labor income, while for households age 70 and older, the
corresponding ratio is 21.1. Thus the old are much more exposed to uctuations in asset prices
than the young. We will ensure, by force of calibration, that the life-cycle patterns of labor income
and net worth in our structural OLG model are identical to the empirical proles documented here.
While Figure 1 suggests large losses for older households from a slump in asset prices, the risk
2Asset income is dened as interest or dividend income (minus interest payment on debts), income from capital
gains and asset sales, one-third of business, farm, or self-employment income, private retirement income, and
imputed rents from owner-occupied housing. Non-asset income is all other income, which includes wage and salary
income, two-thirds of business, farm, or self-employment income, social security income, and a variety of public and
private transfers.
3We set imputed rents equal to the value of primary residence times the rate of return on all other assets. This
rate of return is computed as asset income (excluding imputed rents) divided by aggregate assets (excluding the
value of primary residences and the value of vehicles).
4Since income questions refer to the previous calendar year, while questions about wealth are contemporaneous,
we adjust income measures for CPI ination between 2006 and 2007.
4Table 1: Income and Wealth Over the Life Cycle (2007 SCF, $1,000)
Total Labor Asset Assets Debts Net Worth
Age of Head Income Income Income
All 83.43 70.07 13.36 659.00 103.34 555.66
20-29 38.83 39.68 -0.85 130.66 53.30 77.36
30-39 69.83 68.68 1.15 335.87 136.12 199.75
40-49 93.40 84.97 8.43 598.21 132.62 465.59
50-59 117.97 99.56 18.41 959.77 133.24 826.53
60-69 109.06 76.15 32.90 1156.96 104.10 1052.86
70+ 57.56 34.46 23.11 756.76 28.48 728.28
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5composition of net worth also varies quite substantially with age. To accurately estimate losses
by age group, we therefore further decompose portfolios by age group and examine the patterns
for relative price changes across dierent asset classes. In Table 2 we decompose total net worth
into risky net worth and safe net worth, where we dene risky net worth as the value of stocks,
residential real estate, non-corporate business, and non-residential property. We dene safe net
worth as the value of all other assets, less all debts.5 In aggregate, risky net worth is 93.9 of
aggregate net worth. However, among 30-39 year olds, the corresponding ratio is 140.4%, while
among those aged 70 or older, it is only 79.2%. These three ratios reect three facts: (i) in
aggregate, net household holdings of safe assets are very small, (ii) younger households are short
in safe assets, because they tend to have substantial mortgage debt (which we classify as a riskless
liability) and only small holdings of nancial assets, and (iii) older households tend to have little
debt and lots of assets, including a signicant position in riskless nancial assets.
Table 2: Portfolio Shares as a Percentage of Net Worth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Age of Stocks Res, real Non-corp Non-res RISKY Bonds Cars Other Debts SAFE
Head estate bus. prop. N.W. + CDs assets N.W.
All 30.28 46.99 12.87 3.80 93.95 16.98 3.45 4.23 -18.60 6.05
20-29 13.20 77.67 43.31 1.28 135.46 13.66 15.26 4.51 -68.90 -35.46
30-39 26.27 96.47 12.73 4.97 140.44 13.80 9.73 4.19 -68.15 -40.44
40-49 30.41 57.62 12.55 3.81 104.38 15.17 4.44 4.49 -28.48 -4.38
50-59 32.70 42.40 13.53 3.72 92.35 17.02 2.79 3.96 -16.12 7.65
60-69 32.17 35.62 13.41 4.12 85.31 17.45 2.40 4.73 -9.89 14.69
70+ 27.12 39.76 8.98 3.33 79.18 19.26 1.75 3.72 -3.91 20.82
Risky Net Worth (5) is equal to the sum of columns (1)+(2)+(3)+(4). Safe Net Worth (10) is the sum
of columns (6)+(7)+(8)+(9). Total Net Worth is the sum of columns (5)+(10).
Our next task is to estimate price declines for each component of net worth. The 2007 SCF
provides a snapshot of household portfolios in the middle of 2007, roughly when asset prices
peaked.6 We estimate the direct redistributive eects of dramatic changes in asset prices by using
aggregate asset-class-specic price series to revalue portfolios, thereby constructing estimates for
capital losses for each age group.
5For our purposes, stocks include stocks held directly or indirectly through mutual funds and retirement accounts
and also includes closely held equity. The category \Bonds + CDs" includes bonds (directly or indirectly held),
cash, transaction accounts, CDs, and the cash value of life insurance.
6The Federal Reserve is currently conducting a special re-survey of some of the same households, to study the
eects of the nancial crisis.
6We assume that SCF portfolios reect the distribution of household net worth in the second
quarter of 2007.7 We then revalue portfolios for each age group, and for each successive quarter,
as follows. For all the components of safe net worth (bonds, vehicles, other assets and debts), we
assume no price changes. We price stock wealth using the Wilshire 5000 price index, as of the last
trading day in the quarter. We price residential real estate using the Case-Shiller National Home
Price Index, which is a quarterly, repeat-sales-based index. We price non-residential property using
the Moodys/REAL Commercial Property Price Index, which is a monthly repeat-sales-based index
for the prices of apartments, industrial property, commercial property, and retail property. We price
non-corporate business wealth using Flow of Funds data.8 Price changes by asset type relative to
2007:2 are reported in Table 3. For stocks and residential property, values reached a low point
in the rst quarter of 2009 with prices respectively 46.9% and 29.5% below their 2007:2 values.
The values of non-corporate business and non-residential property, by contrast, continue to decline
through 2009, and are at through 2010.9
Table 3: Price Declines Relative to 2007:2 by Risky Asset Class
2008 2009 2010
PRICE SERIES USED Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Stocks -12.4 -14.2 -22.0 -40.3 -46.9 -38.4 -28.6 -24.7 -20.5 -29.7 -22.1 -13.5
Res. Real Estate -13.0 -14.9 -17.8 -23.9 -29.5 -27.3 -24.9 -25.8 -27.9 -24.5 -25.9 -28.8
Non-corp. Bus. -4.2 -8.0 -10.6 -17.6 -22.2 -25.0 -25.4 -27.9 -26.5 -25.0 -26.0 -25.5
Non-Res. Property -0.2 -9.6 -7.1 -14.3 -20.9 -33.9 -41.5 -39.3 -40.6 -39.9 -41.3 -40.6
Household Net Worth -10.4 -12.7 -16.7 -26.2 -31.7 -29.0 -25.2 -24.7 -24.3 -25.3 -23.8 -22.5
ALTERNATIVE SERIES
Stocks (Flow of Funds) -9.9 -13.1 -22.8 -39.3 -47.7 -38.3 -27.8 -25.4 -21.6 -31.4 -22.6 -12.8
Real Estate (OFHEO) -5.3 -5.8 -9.0 -12.6 -12.1 -10.7 -12.1 -14.3 -14.6 -12.9 -15.5 -17.2
Real Estate (Flow of Funds) -9.1 -13.2 -16.8 -21.8 -26.3 -26.2 -25.6 -25.7 -25.0 -24.6 -27.2 -28.2
We now turn to investigating how these price changes have reduced household net worth by
applying the price changes in Table 3 to the life-cycle proles for aggregate net worth and its
decomposition as outlined in Tables 1 and 2.10 The line labelled \Household Net Worth" in Table
3 shows the implied series for aggregate household net worth. Table 4 reports changes in net
worth from 2007:2 to 2009:1, in the aggregate and by age group. In the rst set of columns, we
7Unfortunately the SCF does not provide much information about precisely when households were interviewed.
8In particular the Flow of Funds reports changes in market values for a variety of asset types by sector. We focus
on the asset type \proprietors' investment in unincorporated business" for the household and non-prot sector.
9For comparison, Table 3 also reports some alternative price series. The Flow of Funds reports price changes
for directly held corporate equities: this series aligns closely with the Wilshire 5000 index. The Flow of Funds also
reports a price series for residential real estate, based on the Loan Performance Index from First American Corelogic.
This series closely tracks the Case-Shiller series. By contrast, the house price series published by OFHEO (based
on data from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) shows signicantly smaller declines in house values.
10Of course, this exercise ignores the endogenous response of household portfolios to changing asset prices
between 2007 and 2009.
7simply report dollar losses across our risky asset types. We focus on the cumulative price changes
as of the rst quarter of 2009, since this was the quarter in which portfolio-weighted asset values
attained their nadir (see Table 3). We then report total dollar losses, total losses as fractions of
age-group specic net worth and age-group specic total income, and total losses as a fraction of
average total income.
The average household saw a price-change-induced decline in net worth of $176,000 between
2007:2 and 2009:1, which amounted to 32% of 2007:2 net worth, and more than twice average
annual income in 2007. Almost half of this total decline was driven by a decline in stock prices,
and almost half by a decline in house prices.
Losses varied widely by age. Younger households lost much less, while those in the 60-69 age
group lost the most: $310,000 on average, or nearly four times average annual income for this
age group. At the same time, dierences in portfolio composition were large enough to generate
substantial age variation in returns. In particular, because younger households were more leveraged,
they lost more as a percentage of their net worth: 30-39 year olds lost 45% of net worth, while
households older than 70 lost only 27%. In other words, absent age variation in portfolios, but
given the empirical age prole for net worth, the losses experienced by younger households would
have been smaller, and those experienced by older households would have been even larger.
Table 4: Estimated Losses by Age Group as of 2009:1
Dollar Losses ($1,000) Losses as Percentage of
Age of Stocks Res. real Non-corp. Non-res. Total Net Income Avg.
Head estate bus. property Losses Worth Income
All 78.99 76.97 15.90 4.42 176.27 31.7 211.3 211.3
20-29 4.79 17.71 7.44 0.21 30.16 39.0 77.7 36.1
30-39 24.64 56.80 5.65 2.08 89.16 44.6 127.7 106.9
40-49 66.47 79.07 12.98 3.71 162.24 34.8 173.7 194.5
50-59 126.91 103.29 24.85 6.43 261.47 31.6 221.6 313.4
60-69 159.01 110.53 31.36 9.08 309.97 29.4 284.2 371.5
70+ 92.73 85.34 14.53 5.07 197.67 27.1 343.4 236.9
Figure 2 presents the losses as a percentage of net worth for additional dates. By the last
quarter of 2010, asset prices had partially recovered, but were still 22.5% below their peak values.

















The facts documented above guide our modeling choices. First, the substantial heterogeneity by
household age in labor income and net worth translates into age-varying exposure to aggregate wage
and asset price risk. Thus, a satisfactory quantitative analysis requires an overlapping-generations
life-cycle model with aggregate shocks. Our general equilibrium approach in which asset prices
respond endogenously to aggregate output uctuations provides a theoretical link between the
dynamics of income, consumption, and savings on the one hand and asset prices on the other.
Second, empirical portfolio allocations between risky and riskless assets display signicant age
heterogeneity, which translates into age variation in the sensitivity of net worth to aggregate shocks.
This motivates us to consider models with both risky and safe assets.
Third, the direct eect of recessions on labor income varies across age groups, largely reecting
the fact that younger workers are disproportionately likely to become unemployed.11 This fact
induces us to explore a version of the model in which recessions not only change the level of the
11In Section 7 we will document the extent of this age variation in labor income declines in the Great Recession.
9age-earnings prole, but its shape as well (see Section 7).
3.1 Stochastic Structure
Aggregate uctuations in the model are driven by shocks to aggregate productivity z, where z has
nite support Z and evolves over time according to a Markov chain with transition matrix  z,z0.
3.2 Technology
A representative rm operates a Cobb-Douglas technology that takes as inputs a xed factor K
and labor L, and produces as output a non-storable consumption good Y. The rm's total factor
productivity (TFP) varies with the aggregate productivity shock. Thus
Y = z K
 L
1 
where  2 (0,1) is the capital share of output. We normalize K = 1.
One interpretation of our assumption that capital K is in xed supply is that K stands in for
non-reproducible land or intangible capital. By making the stock of capital xed, any changes in
the demand for assets (i.e., claims to the returns to capital) must translate into movements in
asset prices rather than changes in the quantity of capital. This property is important given our
focus on the welfare eects of great recessions that are accompanied by large asset price declines.
In the standard frictionless business cycle model, by contrast, capital and consumption are the
same good, and thus this model cannot generate any movements in the relative price of capital.
3.3 Endowments
Households live for I periods and then die with certainty. Thus the economy is populated by I
distinct age cohorts at any point in time. Each age cohort is composed of identical households.
In each period of their lives households are endowed with one unit of time which they supply to
the market inelastically. Their age- and productivity-dependent labor productivity prole is given
by f"i(z)gI
i=1. Indexing the productivity prole to the aggregate shock will allow us to capture
heterogeneity across age groups in the impact of economic downturns on labor income (Section
7). We normalize units so that
PI
i=1 "i(z) = 1 for all z 2 Z. Thus the aggregate supply of labor
is constant and equal to L = 1 at all times. This normalization also implies that aggregate output
is given by Y(z) = z for all z 2 Z.
10Labor markets are competitive, and therefore the economy-wide wage per labor eciency unit
supplied is equal to the marginal product of labor from the production technology:
w(z) = (1   )z.
Note that because the aggregate supply of capital and labor is exogenous, and the labor share of
income is constant, uctuations in z need not be interpreted simply as neutral shocks to multi-
factor productivity: they could equally well capture uctuations in capital or labor productivity, or
capital or labor utilization rates. Thus our model is consistent with a range of alternative theories
regarding the fundamental sources of business cycles.
3.4 Preferences
Households have standard time-separable preferences over stochastic consumption streams fcigI
i=1









where i is the time discount factor between age i   1 and i (we normalize 1 = 1). Age
variation in the discount factor stands in for unmodeled changes in family size and composition,
age-specic mortality risk, and any other factors that generate age variation in the marginal utility
of consumption. We will calibrate the prole figI
i=1 so that our economy replicates the life-cycle
prole for net worth documented in SCF data in Section 2.
Expectations E(.) are taken with respect to the underlying stochastic process governing aggre-




where the parameter  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and  = 1
corresponds to log-utility.
113.5 Financial Markets
Agents trade nancial assets to transfer resources over time. We consider three alternative market
structures that dier in the set of assets that can be traded. In the rst, households can save
only by purchasing shares of the capital stock, which entitle the owner to capital income. This
model allows us to highlight the main mechanism at work in the most transparent way. The
second market structure features two assets: leveraged risky equity and riskless bonds. However,
households' portfolio allocations are treated as exogenous parameters and calibrated to replicate
the portfolio composition across risky and riskless assets by age, as observed in the SCF. With this
version of the model we can assess the quantitative importance of age variation in portfolio shares
for our asset pricing and welfare results. Finally we consider a third market structure in which the
choice of portfolios is endogenous. The point of this economy is to investigate the extent to which
we can rationalize observed portfolio choices over the life cycle with our model, and to document
how the ability of dierent generations to trade risk aects equilibrium prices and the distribution
of welfare losses from an adverse aggregate shock.
Given that the primary goal of the paper is to assess the distributional implications of severe
recessions, we will be most interested in the quantitative results for the second economy, because
in that economy we exactly replicate, by force of calibration, both the empirical life-cycle prole
for net worth and the life-cycle prole for risky versus safe portfolio shares. We therefore consider
the second economy our benchmark.
The one-asset economy is a special case of the two-asset economies in which the aggregate
supply of riskless bonds is set to zero and each age group puts 100% of savings into risky equity.
The economies with exogenous and endogenous portfolios dier only with respect to whether
the division of household savings between stocks and bonds is specied exogenously or chosen
optimally. We will therefore dene a recursive competitive equilibrium only once, focussing on
the most general model: the two-asset economy with endogenous portfolios. Also note that if
the aggregate shock z can only take two values (the case we will consider in our quantitative
experiments below), then the two-asset economy with endogenous portfolio choice is equivalent
to an economy in which markets are sequentially complete. In Appendix A we show how to map
the two-asset economy into a complete markets economy with state-contingent share purchases,
and in Appendix B we discuss how we exploit this mapping in our computation of the two-asset
economy with endogenous portfolio choice. Finally, note that while agents can insure against life-
cycle shocks in the endogenous portfolios economy, they cannot buy insurance ex ante against the
12date and state in which they become economically active. Thus aggregate shocks will still have
redistributive consequences between existing and newly active households.
We will now present a recursive denition of competitive equilibrium. The aggregate state of
the economy is described by the current aggregate shock z and the cross-sectional distribution
A = (A1,...,AI) of shares of beginning of the period total wealth, where
PI
i=1 Ai = 1. Newborn
households enter the economy with zero initial wealth, so that A1 = 0. Individual state variables
include a household's age i and its individual share of wealth, denoted by a.
The representative rm issues a constant quantity B of risk-free real bonds at a price q(z,A)
per unit. Each bond is a promise to pay one unit of the consumption good in the next period.
We treat the supply of debt B as an exogenous time- and state-invariant parameter of the model.
Dividends for the representative rm d(z,A) are then given by aggregate capital income z plus
revenue from debt issuance q(z,A)B less debt repayment B :
d(z,A) =  z   [1   q(z,A)] B (1)
Note that returns to equity are risky, while the return to debt is safe and given by the reciprocal
of the bond price. The supply of debt B determines the level of leverage in the economy: the
higher is B, the more leveraged and risky are stocks. Let p(z,A) denote the ex-dividend price of
equity. The aggregate value of start of period wealth is the value of aggregate payments to asset
holders in the period, plus the ex-dividend value of equity:
W(z,A) = p(z,A) + d(z,A) + B
= p(z,A) +  z + q(z,A) B,
where the second equality follows from the expression for dividends in equation (1).
3.6 Household Problem
Let yi(z,A,a) and i(z,A,a) denote the optimal household policy functions for total savings and
for the fraction of savings invested in leveraged equity. Let ci(z,A,a) and a0
i(z,A,z0,a) denote the
associated policy functions for consumption and for shares of next period wealth. The dynamic




























The rst constraint (3) is the household's budget constraint: consumption plus savings must equal
labor earnings plus the household's share of start of period wealth.12 The second constraint (4)
is the law of motion for the household's share of individual wealth. This constraint merits some
additional explanation. Savings in equity are given by y, and the gross return on these savings
is given by [p(z0,A0) + d(z0,A0)]=p(z,A). Savings in bonds are given by (1   )y, and the gross
return on these savings is 1=q(z,A). Thus the numerator on the right-hand side of equation (4) is
the gross value of the household portfolio at the beginning of next period. The household's share
of next period wealth is this value divided by aggregate next period wealth, the denominator on
the right-hand side of (4). The third constraint is the law of motion for the wealth distribution,
which allows agents to forecast future prices, contingent on the sequence for future productivity.
Let Gi(z,A,z0) denote the forecast for the share of next period wealth owned by age group i.
Denition 1. A recursive competitive equilibrium is a value and policy functions for each age,
vi(z,A,a), ci(z,A,a), yi(z,A,a), a0
i(z,A,z0,a), i(z,A,a), pricing functions w(z), d(z,A), p(z,A),
q(z,A), and an aggregate law of motion G(z,A) such that:
1. Given the pricing functions and the aggregate law of motion, the value functions fvig solve
the recursive problem of the households and fci,yi,a0
i,ig are the associated policy functions.
2. Wages and dividends satisfy
w(z) = (1   ) z and d(z,A) =  z   [1   q(z,A)]B.








i(z,A,Ai) yi(z,A,Ai) = p(z,A)
I X
i=1
[1   i(z,A,Ai)] yi(z,A,Ai) = B q(z,A).
4. The law of motion for the distribution of wealth is consistent with equilibrium decision rules
G1(z,A,z







0, i = 1,...,I   1. (7)
4 Developing Intuition: Four Simple Example Economies
In order to develop intuition for the key mechanisms at work in our model, we now study four
simple example economies: a representative agent version of our environment, and three special
cases of our general OLG economy. These examples are designed to highlight a) what determines
the magnitude of equilibrium asset price movements, relative to movements in output, and b)
what determines how price movements translate into welfare eects that vary across dierent
generations.
From now on, we will assume that the aggregate shock takes only two values: Z = fzl,zhg,
where zl stands for a severe recession. We will measure the magnitude of the decline in asset





where it is understood that, in general, prices and thus the elasticity , are functions of the
distribution of wealth in the economy prior to the recession. An elasticity of  = 3, for example,
indicates that the percentage decline in stock prices when the economy enters the recession is three
times as large as the fall in output.
154.1 Example I: Representative Agent Model
Our rst simple economy is the standard innitely lived representative-agent Lucas asset pricing
model (translated into our physical environment).13 Given the existence of a representative agent,
the distribution of wealth is degenerate. With Markov shocks, the only state variable is current
productivity z. Furthermore, if aggregate shocks are iid (which we will assume in our baseline











RA = . When aggregate shocks are not iid, the same result still obtains in two special
cases:  = 1 (unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution) or  = 1 (no discounting). The logic
for why prices become more sensitive to output as the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 1=
is reduced is familiar and straightforward. For the stock market to clear, stock prices (and expected
returns) must adjust to output uctuations such that the representative household neither wants
to buy nor sell stocks. The less willing are households to substitute consumption over time, the
more prices must fall (and expected returns increase) in order to induce households to maintain
constant stock holdings in response to a decline in output and thus consumption.
In the recent Great Recession in the United States, asset prices fell roughly three times as much
as output. The representative agent economy generates 
RA = 3 when  = 3. Of course, although
this economy is a useful benchmark, it has nothing to say about dierential welfare eects across
age groups, our main object of interest in this paper.
4.2 Example II: Log Utility and iid Shocks
With logarithmic utility, iid aggregate shocks, and an age-income prole that is independent of
the aggregate shock, it is possible to characterize several features of the competitive equilibrium
in closed form, even for the case in which households choose their portfolios endogenously. The
following proposition is proved (by construction) in Appendix C and does not hinge on z taking
only two values.
Proposition 1. Assume that i) the period utility function is logarithmic ( = 1), (ii) aggregate
productivity shocks have no eect on relative earnings across age groups ("i(z) = "i 8z) and (iii)
13The detailed analysis is contained in Appendix D.
16productivity shocks are iid over time ( z,z0 =  z0).Then there exists a recursive competitive equi-
librium in the two-asset economy with endogenous portfolio choice with the following properties:





0,Ai) = Ai+1 8z,z
0, 8i = 1,...,I   1
G1(z,A,z
0) = 0 8z
2. Stock and bond prices are proportional to the aggregate productivity shock:
q(z,A) = zq 8z
p(z,A) = zp 8z,
where q and p are constants.
3. Portfolios are constant both over time and across age groups:
i(z,A,Ai) =  =
p
p + qB
8z, 8i = 1,...,I   1.
4. Consumption and savings for all age groups are proportional to the aggregate productivity
shock:
ci(z,A,Ai) = zci = z







yi(z,A,Ai) = zyi = zAi+1 (p + qB) 8z, 8i = 1,...,I   1.
5. The value of aggregate wealth relative to output is independent of the distribution for pro-
ductivity shocks and independent of the supply of debt:
p(z,A) + q(z,A)B
z
= p + qB = 	,
where the constant 	 depends on various model parameters of the model, but not on the
value of B.





























This proposition has various implications. First, for this particular parameterization with log
utility, the model predicts that asset prices fall by exactly as much as output in the recession,  = 1.
Second, portfolio allocations are counterfactual since the share invested in stocks is age-invariant
in the model, but declining with age in the data. Third, since consumption of all age cohorts varies
one-for-one with the aggregate shock, all households lose from a recession, including the youngest






E[z] = 1) and is increasing in
the supply of debt B (because p + qB = 	 is independent of B, and p is declining in B).
Although the log utility specication delivers clean closed-form solutions, it is of limited interest
from the applied perspective of assessing the welfare eects of the Great Recession, primarily
because it cannot generate a large decline in asset prices, relative to the decline of output, as
observed in the data.14 We therefore now move to exploring deviations from log-utility.
4.3 Example III: Two-Period OLG Economy
Outside the log-iid case, closed-form solutions for OLG economies with aggregate risk are not
available, to the best of our knowledge. To build intuition for this case, we begin with the simplest
OLG framework, in which households live for only two periods: I = 2. We use this example to
discuss how the curvature parameter  aects the elasticity  of price changes to output changes
in OLG economies. We focus on the one-asset economy (B = 0) and assume that households only
earn labor income in the rst period of life: "1 = 1 and "2 = 0. Since young households start with
zero assets, all wealth is held by old agents. Thus the wealth distribution is time invariant and
degenerate in this economy. As in the representative agent model, the only state variable is the
exogenous shock z 2 fzl,zhg.
14However, this parameterization is useful as a test case for assessing the accuracy of our computational algorithm.
18Consumption of young and old households is given by
c1(z) = (1   )z   p(z)
c2(z) = z + p(z),
and the prices of shares are determined by the intertemporal Euler equation










No closed-form solution is available for the functional equation p(z) that solves equation (8) outside
of the special cases  = 0 and  = 1. However, in Appendix E we derive an approximate expression
for the elasticity 















p > 1 is the steady state gross return on the stock.16
Note rst that for  = 1 this formula is exact (as shown in the previous section) and delivers

2p = 
RA = 1: prices fall by exactly as much as output in a downturn. Second, 
2p is increasing
in , and thus for  > 1 we have 
2p > 1. Third, 
2p < 
RA. Thus, as long as the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution 1= is smaller than one, asset prices fall by more than output in a recession,
but by less than in the corresponding representative-agent economy with innitely lived households.
For example, suppose we think of a period as 30 years, take  = 3, and set  and  such that
the model generates the same interest rate and the same wealth to income ratio as our baseline
quantitative six-period model (see Section 5). These choices imply that  = 0.311 and  = 0.3008.
Then, using the expression above, 
2p = 1.97 in the OLG economy, compared to 
RA = 3 in the
representative agent economy.17 The nding that stock prices are less volatile, relative to output,
in OLG economies compared to the innitely lived representative-agent economy will reappear
consistently in the various economies we study. The reason for this is as follows.
15This approximation involves taking linear approximations to the pricing equations around the point zl=zh = 1.
16For  such that R = 




17For the calibration just described, assuming zl=zh = 0.917 and pr(z = zh) = 0.85 the true elasticity is

2p = 1.99, compared to the value of 1.97 from the approximate expression.
19The current old generation clearly suers from the recession since the price of the asset, the
only source for old-age consumption, is lower in the bad than in the good aggregate state of the
world. Moreover, for  > 1, consumption of the old is more sensitive to aggregate shocks than









The second inequality reects the fact that c2(zh)=c2(zl) = ph=pl > zh=zl (since 
2p > 1), while
the rst inequality follows from market clearing: (c1(zh) + c2(zh))=(c1(zl) + c2(zl)) = zh=zl. The
fact that aggregate risk is disproportionately borne by the old explains why stock prices are less
volatile in this economy than in the analogous representative agent economy. Recall that stocks
are eectively priced by younger agents, because the supply of stocks by the old is inelastic at
any positive price. Because the old bear a disproportionate share of aggregate risk, the young's
consumption uctuates less than output. Thus smaller price changes (relative to the representative
agent economy) are required to induce them to purchase the aggregate supply of equity at each
date.
One might wonder whether it is possible that c1(zh) < c1(zl), so that newborn households
would potentially prefer to enter the economy during a recession rather than during a boom. The
answer turns out to be no: while stock prices fall by more than output in the event of a recession,
they never fall by enough to compensate the young for their decline in labor earnings. The logic
for this result is straightforward. In a two-period OLG economy, stock prices are dened by the
inter-temporal rst-order condition for young households (equation 8). With iid shocks, the right-
hand side of this condition is independent of the current value for z. Taking the ratio of the two









The only advantage to the young from entering the economy during a recession is that they buy
stocks cheaply, ph=pl > 1. But then the optimality restriction above implies that c1(zh)=c1(zl) > 1,
so the young must suer relatively low consumption if they enter during a recession. Intuitively,
low prices are needed to induce the young to buy stocks when the marginal utility of current
consumption is high. But a high marginal utility of consumption requires low consumption for
these households.
20This example reveals that for the young to potentially gain from a recession, we need people
to live for at least three periods, while the previous example with logarithmic preferences indicates
that we also require  > 1. We now move to a three-period example to show that the young can
indeed benet from a recession, and provide some intuition for the combination of model elements
required to deliver this result.
4.4 Example IV: Three-Period OLG Economy
Now households live for three periods, I = 3. Households do not value consumption when young
and discount the future at a constant factor 2 = 3 = . They are only productive in the rst
period of their lives, i.e., "1 = 1 and "2 = "3 = 0.
By construction, young households buy as many stocks as they can aord, while the old sell
all the stocks they own. Only the middle-aged make an interesting intertemporal decision, trading
o current versus future consumption. In a recession, falling stock prices will have countervailing
eects on the middle-aged's stock trade decision. On the one hand, low current stock prices oer
an incentive to reduce stock sales to exploit higher expected stock returns (the substitution eect).
On the other, consumption smoothing calls for larger stock sales, since stock sales are the only
source of income for this group (the income eect).
Given that young households start their lives with zero asset holdings and that the total number
of wealth shares has to sum to one, the only endogenous aggregate state variable in this simple
economy is the share of assets held by old households, A3, which we for simplicity denote by A3 = A.
Consequently the share of assets owned by middle-aged households is given by A2 = 1   A.
The rst-order condition for middle-aged households can then be written as
u











where consistency requires that tomorrow's asset share of the old is equal to the number of shares
purchased by the current middle-aged households: A0 = G(z,A). In this expression marginal utility
from consumption when middle aged is equated to discounted expected marginal utility from
consumption when old, adjusted by the gross return on assets [p(z0,A0) + z0]=p(z,A).
The second functional equation determining the pricing and optimal policy functions states
21that the equilibrium demand for shares of the young, 1   G(z,A), equals the number of shares
that can be purchased with total labor income of the young, which is w(z)=p(z) = (1 )z=p(z).
Thus
[1   G(z,A)] p(z,A) = (1   )z. (10)
Equations (9) and (10) form a pair of functional equations that jointly determine the unknown
equilibrium pricing and policy functions p(z,A) and G(z,A). Consumption fc2(z,A),c3(z,A)g
and welfare fv1(z,A),v2(z,A),v3(z,A)g at all ages can easily be calculated from these equilibrium
functions.18
In the log-case with iid shocks, as shown in Section 4.2, consumption of all households is
proportional to the aggregate shock. It then follows directly that in this case, middle-aged and old
households suer welfare losses from the economic downturn, while newborn households (who do
not value current consumption) are exactly indierent between being born in normal times and in
a recession. This suggests that if  > 1, asset prices should move by more than output, which
in turn should be sucient to break the indierence of the young in favor of being born in the
downturn. We briey investigate this conjecture now.
Note that for  6= 1 the recursive competitive equilibrium of the model needs to be solved
numerically, but this is straightforward to do with the only continuous state variable being A. We
choose the same parameter values as in the previous two-period example. The capital share remains
at  = 0.3008 and the time discount factor equals  = (0.311)
20
30 = 0.459, resulting in the same
annualized discount factor as in the two-period model.19 The aggregate shock takes two values
with zl=zh = 0.917. Thus a fall in aggregate technology leads to a decline of aggregate output in
the order of 8.3%, a value we will also use below in the calibrated version of the full model. We
18These are given explicitly as
c3(z,A) = A[p(z,A) + z] (11)
c2(z,A) = (1   A)[p(z,S) + z]   G(z,A)p(z,A) (12)
v3(z,A) = u [c3(z,A)] (13)







 z,z0 v2 [z0,G(z,A)]. (15)
19We are assuming 30-year periods in the-two period OLG model and 20-year periods in the-three period model.
Note also that it is impossible to match the empirical wealth-to-earnings ratio by appropriate choice of  in this
simple model, since households only earn labor income in the rst period of their life and save all of it.
22assume that aggregate shocks are uncorrelated over time in this model in which a period lasts for
20 years.
Figure 3: Fall in Asset Prices in Recession:
p(zl,S)
p(zh,S)
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Figure 3 plots the elasticity of asset prices to output, 
3p, as a function of the share of wealth
held by the old generation, for various values of the IES 1=. Note that, as demonstrated above,
for the logarithmic case  = 1 we have 
3p = 1, independent of the wealth distribution A.20
This gure displays two key ndings. First, the lower is the willingness of households to
intertemporally substitute consumption (the higher is ), the larger is the fall in asset prices,
relative to output, in a recession. Mechanically, when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is less than one, the income eect dominates the substitution eect and the middle-aged sell more
stocks in a recession (compared to normal times) in an attempt to smooth consumption. These
extra shares must be bought by the young which, given inelastic demand, necessitates lower share
prices (see equation (10)). Second, the size of asset price movements depends on the wealth
distribution A when preferences are not logarithmic. The larger is the share of wealth held by the
middle-aged (the smaller is A), the larger is 
3p (assuming  > 1). Once again this is the case,
since it is the net stock sales of the middle-aged that varies with the cycle. The larger the share of
20Given that prices move one-for-one with output, equation (10) implies that G(z,A) must be independent of z,
and thus that the wealth distribution must be constant, consistent with Proposition 1.
23wealth in the hands of the middle-aged households relative to the old, the larger is the downward
pressure on prices in response to a negative shock, since the young must buy more extra shares
with the same amount of earnings.21
For  = 3, the wealth share of the old generation converges to A = 34.2% if the economy
experiences a long sequence of good shocks, and for A = 0.342 we nd a price elasticity of

3p = 1.24. Recall that the corresponding values for the representative-agent and two-period OLG
economies were 
RA = 3 and 
2p = 1.97.
Figure 4: Welfare Consequences of Recessions for Young Households
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The welfare consequences for young generations of starting their economic lives in a recession,
relative to an expansion, are displayed in Figure 4. We measure welfare consequences as the
percentage increase in consumption in all periods of a household's life, under all state contingencies,
that a household born in an expansion would require to be as well o as being born in a recession,
with positive numbers thus reecting welfare gains from a recession. Again we plot these numbers
as a function of the wealth distribution A and for dierent values for . We observe that the
welfare consequences from recessions for the young mirror the elasticity of asset prices to output
21In the economies for which  6= 1 the wealth holdings of the old at the start of a recession need not be the
same as at the start of an expansion, on average. The gure traces out the price dierences between expansions
and recessions, conditional on the same wealth distribution in the economy.
24(Figure 3), conrming that this elasticity is the crucial determinant of how the welfare costs of
recessions are distributed in our class of OLG economies.
The purpose of the sequence of simple examples was to develop intuition for the magnitude of
asset price declines relative to output, and the resulting implications for lifetime welfare of dierent
generations. Our last example in this section displayed welfare gains from a recession for the young
as long as  > 1. However, note that in this example we stacked the deck in several ways in
favor of obtaining this result. First, young households do not value consumption today and thus
are not aected directly by a decline in current aggregate consumption. Second, the middle-aged
and the old have no source of income other than selling shares, which means that they bear a
disproportionate share of the burden of recession. Third, aggregate shocks are purely temporary,
so young households can expect asset prices to recover before they need to sell stocks later in their
life cycle.
The remainder of the paper now documents the size of the asset price decline and the distri-
bution of welfare consequences from a severe and long-lasting recession in a realistically calibrated
OLG economy in which life-cycle labor income and wealth proles match those observed in the
2007 SCF.
5 Calibration
To describe the calibration strategy, we start with the two-asset economy with exogenous portfolios.
We use the same parameter values in the other two economies, with the exception of the life-cycle
prole for portfolio shares, figI
i=1. The one-asset economy can be thought of as a special case in
which portfolio shares do not vary by age. 22 In the two-asset economy with endogenous portfolios,
portfolio shares are equilibrium outcomes rather than parameter choices.
We assume agents enter the economy as adults and live for I = 6 periods, where a period lasts
for 10 years. The preference parameters to calibrate are the coecient of relative risk aversion 
and the life-cycle prole for discount factors figI
i=2. Parameters governing labor endowments over
the life-cycle prole are given by f"i(z)gI
i=1, and parameters governing nancial markets include
the supply of bonds B and the life-cycle prole for portfolio shares allocated to stocks, figI
i=1.
Finally, the technology parameters are the capital share of income  and the support and transition
22In other words, when all households must choose the same portfolio split , the choices for B and  are
irrelevant for real allocations. In Appendix F we relate asset prices in the one-asset economy to asset prices in
the two-asset economy with exogenous portfolios, and show that in the latter one can generate equity premia of
arbitrary size by appropriate choice of portfolio shares fig and/or outstanding bonds B.
25probability matrix   for the aggregate productivity shock.
We rst calibrate the preference and life-cycle parameters using a non-stochastic version of the
economy, in which the productivity shock is set to its average value z = 1. We then specify the
stochastic process for productivity z.
Let re denote the net return on equity in the non-stochastic economy, and let rb be the net
return on bonds. Our calibration strategy can be summarized as follows:
1. Fix risk aversion, , to a benchmark value of 3. We will conduct sensitivity analysis with
respect to this parameter.
2. Set the life-cycle labor endowment prole f(1 )"i(z)gI
i=1 equal to the empirical 2007 SCF
life-cycle prole for labor income, and the portfolio shares figI
i=1 equal to age-group-specic
shares of risky assets in net worth from the SCF.
3. Set the capital share  and the supply of bonds B so that the model generates realistic
returns to risky and safe assets, re and rf.
4. Set the life-cycle prole figI
i=2 so that the model generates the 2007 SCF life-cycle prole
for net worth documented in Section 2, given the other determinants of life-cycle saving: risk
aversion , the prole for earnings f(1 )"i(z)gI
i=1, the exogenous portfolio shares figI
i=1,
and the returns to risky and safe assets, re and rb.
We now describe this calibration procedure in more detail. It delivers realistic (as measured by
the SCF 2007) joint life-cycle proles for earnings, net worth, and portfolio composition. These
are the necessary ingredients for our calibrated OLG model to serve as a suitable laboratory for
exploring the distributional impact of aggregate shocks.
Returns Following Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007), we target annual real returns on safe
and risky assets of 0.75% and 4.75% per annum, where the latter is the return on an equally
weighted portfolio of stocks returning 6.94% and housing returning 2.52%. Given that our period
length is 10 years, this implies






1 + re =




We now describe in more detail how we calibrate the life-cycle proles, before discussing how
to compute the pair (,B) that delivers the target returns re and rb.
Life-cycle proles As described in Section 2 we generate empirical life-cycle proles by com-
puting age-group-specic means in the SCF for holdings of safe assets, net worth, and non-asset
income. The youngest age group corresponds to households aged 20 29, and the sixth and oldest
age group corresponds to households aged 70 and above.
The budget constraints of households in the deterministic version of the model can be written
as
ci = (1   )"i + Riyi 1   yi for i = 1,...,N   1
cN = (1   )"N + RNyN 1,
where yi is total savings for age group i (net worth for age group i +1) and where the gross return
on savings between age i and i + 1 is given by
Ri+1 = i(1 + re) + (1   i)rb.
We measure f(1   )"ig
I
2 as ten times average annual labor income (as dened in Section 2)
of age group i, fyig
I 1
1 as the average net worth of age group i + 1, and fig
I 1
1 as the fraction
of risky assets in aggregate net worth for age group i + 1. Note that returns vary by age because
i is age-varying and re > rb. Because agents in our model enter the economy with zero initial
wealth, we re-categorize asset income for the youngest group in the SCF as labor income: thus we
set R1y0 = 0 and set (1   )"1 equal to ten times average annual labor income for the youngest
group plus the data value for R1y0. We also set yI = 0, since the oldest group does not save in
our model.
Given the sequences f(1   )"ig, fyig and fig, the budget constraints imply a life-cycle
consumption prole, fcig. This consumption prole can be used to back out the sequence of time
discount factors that supports the age-varying prole for returns. In particular, in the non-stochastic








Note that the consumption prole is derived directly from household budget constraints and is
pinned down by the data on labor income, net worth, and returns. Thus, the consumption prole is
independent of preference parameters, and in particular independent of the choice for risk aversion,
. However, supporting this consumption prole as an equilibrium outcome requires a discount
factor prole fig that does depend on . For example, suppose that i =  and thus Ri = R
for all i. Then, the larger is , the more sensitive is the implied prole for i to age variation in
consumption.












20‐29 30‐39 40‐49 50‐59 60‐69 70 or more
Age
Net Worth
Figure 5 shows life-cycle proles for consumption, net worth, and labor income from the non-
stochastic version of our model, and Figure 6 displays the implied calibrated prole fig
I
1, with 1
28normalized to 1. Note that i is generally larger than one. This reects the fact that the data
indicate strong growth in income and net worth over the life cycle between the 20-29 age group
and the 50-59 age group. However, i should not be interpreted solely as capturing pure time
preference: it also incorporates the eects of age variation in family size and composition on the
marginal utility on consumption.












20s to 30s 30s to 40s 40s to 50s 50s to 60s 60s to 70s
Age
Technology Because the model is calibrated to replicate observed life-cycle proles for earnings,
net worth, and portfolio composition, it will also replicate the ratio of aggregate safe assets to
aggregate net worth, and the ratio of aggregate net worth to aggregate (10 year) labor income.23










23In our model, each age group is assumed to be of equal size. Thus, given that we replicate SCF portfolios
for each age group, the appropriate aggregate targets are simple unweighted averages across age groups. Because
these age groups are not of exactly identical size in the SCF, these aggregate targets also do not correspond exactly
to SCF population averages, but the dierences turn out to be quite small.
29The expressions for returns in equations (16-17) dene q and p as functions of  and B.
Substituting in these functions, the two ratios above can be used to solve for  and B. The
solutions are  = 0.3008 and B = 0.048.
Aggregate risk We assume that the aggregate shock z takes one of two values, z 2 Z =
fzl,zhg. We set the ratio
zl
zh = 0.917 so that in a recession output falls by 8.3%. This corresponds
to the size of the gap that opened up between actual real GDP per capita and trend real GDP per
capita between the NBER start and end dates for the recession (which we take to be 2007:4 and
2009:2 respectively).24 We assume that z is iid over time, with the probability of z = zh equal to
0.85. Given that a period is 10 years, this implies that the expected duration of periods of high
productivity is 10=0.15 = 66.7 years, while the expected duration of periods of low productivity is
10=0.85 = 11.8 years. Thus in our calibration, a great recession involves a very large and quite
long-lasting decline in output, but is a fairly rare event. Finally, we normalize the z's so that
average output is equal to one.
We think of the age prole for labor income calibrated to 2007 SCF data as corresponding to
the age prole for earnings in normal times: thus "i(zh) = "i(z). We will consider two alternative
models for how this age prole changes in a recession. In Section 6 we start by assuming "i(zl) =
"i(zh) = "i(z). In this case, recessions reduce labor income of all groups proportionately. In Section
7 we then consider an alternative calibration in which recessions also change the slope of the age
prole, reducing labor income relatively more for the young and relatively less for the old. We will
use micro data from the CPS to quantify this change in the life-cycle prole induced by a change
in the aggregate state of the economy.
6 Results with Acyclical Age-Earnings Proles
We now document the asset price and welfare implications of a large recession. We start with
the economy in which labor income proles f"ig do not vary with z, since our results from the
simple models in Section 4 provide us with clear guidance of what to expect, qualitatively, in this
economy. Our baseline value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one-third:  = 3.
We begin by describing the results for the one-asset economy in which only stocks are traded, and
then move to the two other economies, the two-asset economy with exogenous portfolios and the
model in which portfolios are endogenous.
24We dene trend growth to be the average growth rate in GDP per capita between 1947:1 and 2007:4, which
was 2.1% per year.
30One-asset economy In order to display the dynamics of asset prices, we simulate each model
economy, assuming that the sequence for aggregate productivity involves a long period of normal
times, a recession in period zero, and a return to normal times in subsequent periods. Recall that
the shock involves a 8.3% decline in productivity and that agents assign a 15% probability to a
recession occurring in any period.
Figure 7 displays the implied realized paths for asset prices. In the one-asset economy, the
stock price falls by 17% in the period of a recession. The nding that stock prices decline by
more than output is consistent with the intuition developed in Section 4 that for an elasticity of
substitution smaller than one, asset prices are more volatile than the underlying shocks. Prices
decline by 17%, and the elasticity of prices to output is 2.06 (see Table 5).25 Quantitatively, the
decline in the model stock price is smaller than the change in U.S. household net worth from asset
price peak (2007:2) to trough (2009:1), which was 32%. However, recall that the period length in
our model is 10 years. In this light, we note that asset prices in the United States have partially
recovered since early 2009, and by the end of 2010 net worth was only 22% below its mid-2007
peak (see Table 3).
In the recovery period after the shock, the stock price over-shoots, rising above its long-run
value. This reects the endogenous dynamics of the wealth distribution in the model. When the
shock hits, older households, and especially those in the 60{69 year-old age group, sell additional
equity to fund consumption. Thus, in the period after the recession, a larger share of aggregate
wealth is held by younger cohorts, who are net buyers of the asset, while less is held by older
cohorts, who are net sellers. This translates into higher net demand for equity in the period after
the recession and thus a higher stock price.
Table 5 shows that the size of the asset price decline is declining in the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. With log consumption, prices move one-for-one with output, as in the simpler
economies described in Section 4. As in the two-period economy, the price elasticity is a concave
function of the coecient of relative risk aversion: the magnitude of the additional price response
as  increases from 3 to 5 is much smaller than when  goes from 1 to 3. Recall that in an
analogous representative-agent economy with iid shocks, the elasticity is linear in (and in fact
equal to) .
Table 6 displays the welfare consequences of a one-period model recession by age group, with
25Recall that the corresponding value for the two-period OLG economy described in Section 4 was very similar,
at 1.97.
31Figure 7: Equilibrium Asset Prices for All Calibrated Economies






















Economy  = 1  = 3  = 5
Single Asset 1.00 2.06 2.65
Fixed Portfolios
{Stock 1.04 2.19 2.86
{Bond 1.01 2.55 3.49
{Wealth 1.04 2.22 2.91
Endogenous Portfolios
{Stock 1.00 2.89 4.90
{Bond 1.00 2.94 4.95
{Wealth 1.00 2.90 4.90
i = 1 denoting the group that becomes economically active in the recession period.26
In the one-asset economy, the welfare consequences of a recession are monotone in age, with
older generations suering more. For  = 3, the loss for the oldest households is equivalent to a
12.7% decline in consumption. In the model this age group nances roughly half of consumption
from income (evenly split between dividends and non-asset income) and nances the other half by
selling assets. In a recession, income (output) declines by 8.3% and asset prices decline by 17%,
translating into a 12.7% decline in consumption for this age group.
The welfare loss is much smaller for younger age groups for two reasons. First, welfare losses are
expressed in units of lifetime consumption, so relatively small losses for younger households partly
reect the fact that one period of recession accounts for a smaller fraction of remaining lifetime for
the young, relative to the elderly. Second, the ip side of large capital losses for older households
is that young households get to buy stocks at re-sale prices. As the economy recovers (with
high probability) in subsequent periods, stock prices bounce back, and younger generations enjoy
substantial capital gains. The lower is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (and thus the
larger is the recession-induced asset price decline), the more unevenly are welfare costs distributed
across generations, with larger losses for the old and smaller losses for younger households.
To isolate the role of asset price movements in allocating welfare costs across age groups
from the eect of dierential remaining lifetime, we also consider a thought experiment in which
26Welfare gains are measured as the percentage increase in consumption (in all periods and all stages of life)
under a no-recession scenario needed to make households indierent between the current aggregate state being zl
rather than zh. Under both the recession and no-recession scenarios, output realizations after the initial period are
drawn from the same iid distribution described in Section 5.
33Table 6: Expected Welfare Gains from One-Period Recession
Age i  = 1  = 3  = 5
Single-Asset Economy
1  1.62%  0.78%  0.38%
2  2.04%  1.19%  0.82%
3  2.43%  1.29%  0.67%
4  3.57%  2.75%  2.17%
5  5.46%  6.26%  6.57%
6  8.30%  12.66%  15.16%
Fixed Portfolio Economy
1  1.76%  0.66%  0.03%
2  2.63%  2.14%  1.93%
3  2.66%  1.63%  1.03%
4  3.56%  2.72%  2.12%
5  5.10%  5.92%  6.25%
6  7.81%  12.20%  14.83%
Endogenous Portfolio Economy
1  1.62% 0.33% 2.98%
2  2.04%  2.69%  3.08%
3  2.43%  1.97%  0.91%
4  3.57%  3.75%  3.66%
5  5.46%  6.15%  7.34%
6  8.30%  9.20%  11.42%
34a recession lasts for six periods. Because all generations now spend the rest of their lives in a
recession, in this experiment all age variation in welfare losses is driven by asset price movements.
Table 7 reports the change in realized welfare (in the usual consumption equivalent metric) from
experiencing six consecutive periods of depressed output instead of six consecutive periods of
normal output. A comparison of Tables 7 and 6 illustrates that the remaining lifetime eect is
quantitatively important. For example, in the logarithmic utility case ( = 1), welfare losses from
a one-period recession (Table 6) are much smaller for the young than for the old, whereas in the
corresponding six-period recession simulation, the welfare cost is the same for all age groups. This
nding simply reects the content of Proposition 1 that with logarithmic utility, consumption for
each age group is proportional to the aggregate shock.
For  > 1, Table 7 documents that the welfare costs of recessions are disproportionately borne
by the old, even when the recession outlives all age groups. Moreover, the age variation in welfare
losses is large: from  5.7% of consumption for the youngest age group up to  12.7% for the
oldest cohort, indicating that asset price movements are quantitatively very important for the age
distribution of welfare losses.
Exogenous portfolios economy We now turn to the benchmark version of the model with
two assets, in which we exogenously impose the substantial heterogeneity in portfolio composition
across age groups observed in the Survey of Consumer Finances (see Section 2). Recall that in this
version of the model, older households hold a signicant share of their wealth in safe assets, while
younger households are leveraged and thus more exposed to asset price declines. Again, Figure 7
shows the time path for aggregate net worth for this economy, while Table 5 breaks down the price
declines for stocks and bonds in the period of the recession. Note that each bond pays o one unit
of consumption in the period of the recession, as in every other period: this is the denition of a
safe asset. At the same time, the equilibrium price of new bonds (and stocks) must both adjust
so that markets clear, given agents' (optimal) saving choices and the (suboptimal) portfolio shares
they are forced to adopt.
The two-asset model generates a slightly larger decline in asset values in a recession than the
stock-only model described above. To understand why, recall that because younger households are
leveraged in this economy, they suer a larger decline in wealth in the recession period relative to
the one-asset economy. Thus when the recession hits, younger households require an even larger
decline in asset prices (relative to the one-asset model) in order to be willing to absorb the extra
assets older households are selling.
35Table 7: Realized Welfare Gains from Six-Period Recession
Age i  = 1  = 3  = 5
Single-Asset Economy
1  8.30%  5.48%  4.00%
2  8.30%  5.99%  4.29%
3  8.30%  6.90%  4.90%
4  8.30%  9.27%  9.22%
5  8.30%  11.81%  14.42%
6  8.30%  12.66%  15.16%
Fixed Portfolio Economy
1  8.55%  5.82%  4.00%
2  8.68%  7.11%  5.68%
3  8.31%  7.24%  5.55%
4  8.08%  8.97%  9.17%
5  7.92%  11.21%  13.88%
6  7.81%  12.20%  14.83%
Endogenous Portfolio Economy
1  8.30%  4.51% 3.93%
2  8.30%  8.60%  7.69%
3  8.30%  7.70%  4.94%
4  8.30%  9.00%  9.51%
5  8.30%  9.43%  11.35%
6  8.30%  9.20%  11.42%
36Table 6 indicates larger welfare losses for households aged 30{49 in the two-asset economy,
relative to the one-asset model, while households aged 60 and older fare better in the two asset
model. These dierences are readily interpreted: because 30{49 year-old households are now
leveraged, they take a bigger hit in the period of the crisis, while households aged 60 and older
have more safe assets and suer less. Finally, because of the larger asset price declines, newborn
households fare slightly better in the benchmark model than in the one-asset economy: they face
only modest welfare losses.
Endogenous portfolios economy We now move to our nal economy, the economy in which
households choose portfolios freely at each age. Recall that there are only two values for the
aggregate shock, and thus the presence of two assets ensures complete risk sharing within the
set of agents that is active in any two successive periods. However, aggregate shocks will still
have asymmetric eects on the welfare of dierent generations, since the overlapping-generations
structure of the model prevents the cohorts who are alive at a particular point in time from sharing
aggregate risk with past or future generations.
In Figure 8 we plot how equilibrium portfolios in this model vary with age.27 We do this for
three values for risk aversion,  = 1, 3, and 5.
Figure 8: Portfolio Choices of Households in Data and Models




















27These are the portfolio shares after a long sequence of good shocks z = zh.
37In the log case ( = 1) portfolios are age-invariant (see again Proposition 1). For  > 1,
aggregate asset values become more volatile than output, for the usual reason: when agents are
less willing to substitute intertemporally, prices must adjust more to induce agents to tolerate uc-
tuations in consumption. Because asset prices uctuate by more than output, younger households
who have little wealth relative to earnings require a more leveraged portfolio (a higher equity-to-
debt ratio) to face the same exposure to aggregate risk as older (and wealthier) households. Thus,
the equilibrium share of equity in household portfolios is decreasing with age, consistent with the
downward-sloping prole for the share of risky assets in net worth observed in the SCF. While this
qualitative pattern is an important success for the model, for  = 3 or  = 5 age variation in port-
folio composition is larger in the model than in the data. Thus, for these values for  empirically
observed portfolios do not vary quite enough with age to share risk eciently across generations:
older Americans are over-exposed to aggregate risk in the data, relative to what is optimal from
the perspective of the model.
Figure 7 indicates (for  = 3) that in the endogenous portfolio model, asset prices decline by
24% and thus by more than in the other two model economies. This reects the fact that with
endogenous portfolios, younger households are more heavily leveraged. Thus, compared to the
other economies, younger households take a bigger hit in the period of the shock. This translates
into a larger decline in equilibrium consumption for younger households and necessitates a larger
fall in asset prices to preserve asset market clearing. Table 5 indicates that price changes in the
complete markets economy are very similar to those that would emerge in a representative-agent
economy, with a price to output decline elasticity roughly equal to  (see Section 4.1).
Turning to welfare (Table 6), when portfolios are endogenous the oldest households suer less
(relative to the other economies) in a recession, because they hold more safe assets. Conversely,
younger households (e.g., 30-49 year olds) generally fare worse, due to greater leverage. The
dierences in welfare losses by age between the models with exogenous and endogenous portfolios
oer one metric for how far observed U.S. portfolios are from those that deliver ecient inter-
generational risk sharing through the trade of nancial assets.
Note that there is no way for agents alive in the period before the recession to share risk with
the new cohort that enters the economy in the recession period itself. Since asset prices fall so
signicantly in the endogenous portfolios economy, the youngest households are actually better o
entering the economy during a recession compared to normal times. For  = 3 their welfare gain
is equivalent to a one third of 1% increase in lifetime consumption, in an economy that features an
empirically realistic fall in asset prices and an endogenously chosen portfolio allocation reasonably
38close to the data.
Thus the endogenous portfolios economy delivers an interesting twist: the fact that existing
generations diversify aggregate risk eciently magnies asset price declines. These larger asset
price declines in turn work to decrease eective risk sharing between generations alive in the
previous period and new labor market entrants.
7 Results with Cyclical Age-Earnings Prole
So far we have assumed that in a recession, labor incomes of all age groups decline proportionally
to the fall in output and the aggregate wage. However, in reality young households are especially
vulnerable to unemployment, while non-cyclical social security benets are an important part of
the non-asset income of older age groups. To the extent that recessions have a disproportionate
direct negative impact on younger households for these reasons, this will work to oset the benets
the young enjoy from sharp falls in asset prices. To quantify the importance of this osetting and
empirically relevant eect, we conduct an experiment in which recessions have asymmetric eects
on the non-asset income of dierent age groups.
Because we have no recession data on income from the SCF we turn to the March CPS to
estimate how the Great Recession aected labor incomes across age groups. Our CPS measure
of non-asset income is conceptually close to the SCF measure of labor income we previously
used to calibrate the life-cycle prole for model earnings . This measure includes all CPS income
components except for dividends, interest, rents, and one-third of self-employment income. For the
year 2007, the SCF and CPS life-cycle proles for labor income align quite closely.28 In calibrating
the alternative experiment in this section, we assume that the life-cycle prole for labor productivity
when aggregate productivity is high f"i(zh)g
I
i=1 corresponds exactly to the 2007 SCF-based prole
used in the baseline version of the model. We then measure the percentage decline in labor income
by age group in the CPS between 2007 and 2009 (survey years 2008 and 2010).29 Finally, we
choose a life-cycle prole for the recession state f"i(zl)g
I
i=1 such that when the model economy
transits into a recession, it replicates the dierentials across age groups in percentage labor income
declines in the CPS. The declines in earnings by age group fed into the model are then as follows:
From the CPS data we observe that indeed the age-earnings prole shifts in favor of older
28The main dierence is that the SCF shows higher non-asset income for the 50-59 and 60-69 year old age groups.
29The dierentials across age groups turn out to be very similar when considering a much narrower measure of
labor income that only includes wage and salary income.
39Table 8: Recession Decline in Model Earnings
(%)








generations: the decline in earnings in the recession disproportionately impacts younger generations.
It is therefore to be expected that the welfare consequences are less favorable for the young and
less detrimental for the old, relative to our benchmark in the previous section.
We now repeat the experiments from Section 6 with the stochastically uctuating age-earnings
prole. Figure 9 plots the endogenously chosen asset portfolios for  = 3 in this version of the
model (labelled \age-specic shocks") and compares it to the portfolio allocations in the data and
in the previous version of the model in which aggregate shocks were age neutral. We observe
that with age-specic shocks the portfolio share in stocks declines less steeply with age, and
therefore matches the data better, relative to the case with age-neutral shocks. The reason for
the lower leverage of the young generation is that these households now face more direct exposure
to aggregate income risk (their labor incomes fall especially sharply in economic downturns), and
thus they are less willing to take on additional indirect exposure by holding risky equities. The
reverse is true for older households.30
We now briey report on the welfare consequences of a one-period recession in this economy.
Appendix G reports asset price elasticities and the additional welfare results.
From Table 9 (the counterpart of Table 6) we observe that the welfare losses of the elderly
from a recession tend to be smaller now and that the young lose more. This tilting of welfare losses
across the age distribution is due to the fact that now the young face signicantly larger income
falls in recessions.31 Now young households, the net buyers of assets, have especially low income in
30In fact, for  = 1 when previously portfolios were constant over the life cycle, the higher risk of labor incomes
for the young now induces them to hold (counterfactually) a safer portfolio than older households.
31The asset price decline is steeper in this version of the model, relative to the one with age-neutral productivity
shocks. Compare Table 5 with Table A-2 in the Appendix.
40Figure 9: Portfolio Choices of Households in Data and Models



















41Table 9: Expected Welfare Gains from One-Period Recession (cyclical age-earnings
prole)
Age i  = 1  = 3  = 5
Single-Asset Economy
1  3.69%  1.30%  0.80%
2  4.36%  2.05%  1.60%
3  3.51%  1.13%  0.44%
4  4.36%  2.96%  2.37%
5  4.72%  6.05%  6.47%
6  5.95%  11.34%  14.08%
Fixed Portfolio Economy
1  3.71%  1.20%  0.45%
2  4.75%  3.08%  2.83%
3  3.69%  1.49%  0.81%
4  4.30%  2.93%  2.32%
5  4.45%  5.68%  6.12%
6  5.38%  10.69%  13.57%
Endogenous Portfolio Economy
1  2.43%  0.44% 2.26%
2  2.22%  2.79%  3.48%
3  3.09%  2.80%  1.83%
4  3.45%  3.94%  4.04%
5  4.57%  5.36%  6.45%
6  7.65%  8.05%  9.73%
42recessions and therefore require larger price declines in order to be willing to buy the assets. This
larger price decline partially compensates the young for the larger income declines they experience
in recessions. Overall, for  = 3 or  = 5, welfare losses from a one-period recession still increase
sharply with age.32 When  = 5 and portfolios are chosen endogenously, agents are still better o
when becoming economically active during a recession rather than during normal times, despite
the fact that their labor income is 11% lower during the rst 10 years of their life.33
Overall, we conclude that our results from the previous section are qualitatively robust: welfare
losses increase with age, and the oldest households lose the most from a severe recession. In
addition, if the asset price decline is large relative to the fall in output and earnings (as was the
case in the Great Recession), then the youngest households continue to benet from becoming
economically active in a recession, despite the sharp decline in labor income they experience.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the distributional consequences of a large recession across dierent
age cohorts. In a quantitative version of our stochastic overlapping-generations economy restricted
to match life-cycle income and asset proles from the SCF, we nd that older households suer
large welfare losses from a severe, long-lasting recession. Young households, in contrast, lose less
and might even benet from an economic downturn. The key statistic determining these welfare
consequences is the size of the equilibrium asset price decline, relative to the fall in wages and out-
put. If households have a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution, then middle-aged households
are keen to sell their assets in a downturn in order to smooth consumption, putting additional
downward pressure on asset prices. This generates larger welfare losses for older households and
potential welfare gains for households that become economically active during the recession and
buy assets at re sale prices.
Knowledge about how the welfare costs of recessions are distributed across the age distribution
can help inform the discussion of the appropriate policy response. Many of the policies that have
been implemented in response to the Great Recession have obvious distributional consequences.
32Table A-3 in the appendix reports welfare results from a six-period recession in this version of the model. For
 = 1, the welfare costs of a very prolonged slump are now declining with age, while they were age-invariant in the
version with age-neutral shocks (recall Table7). However, for  = 3 or 5, welfare costs are still generally increasing
with age.
33The large fall in labor income for the young in recessions partly reects lower hours worked. To the extent that
lower market hours translate into additional and valued leisure, our welfare estimates might actually understate
welfare gains for the young.
43First, nancing an increasing share of the government budget through debt rather than taxation
shifts the tax burden toward the young and future generations, benetting older age groups.
Second, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and large-scale asset purchases by the Federal
Reserve (LSAP) were policies that were more or less explicitly designed to support asset prices.
To the extent that these policies were successful, these were policies that also benetted older
and therefore wealthier households.34 From the perspective of the very asymmetric welfare results
documented in this paper, a distributional argument can be made in favor of such policies. We
view a full quantitative exploration of this hypothesis as an obvious next step in the analysis, but
beyond the scope of the current paper.
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45Appendix
A Economy with Endogenous Portfolios and Complete Markets
Since in our applications the number of values the aggregate state can take is two, markets are
sequentially complete when households can freely trade a bond and a stock. We exploit this for
the purposes of characterizing equilibrium prices and quantities numerically. In particular, we solve
the model assuming agents trade state-contingent claims to capital. We then reconstruct the
equilibrium prices of conventional stocks and bonds as additional (eectively redundant) assets.35
Let ai(z0) be shares of stock purchased by a household of age i. These shares represent a claim
to fraction ai(z0) of the capital stock if and only if aggregate state z0 is realized in the next period.
The state of the economy is the distribution of shares of stock A, given the current period shock
z. We denote the state-contingent stock prices P(z,A,z0).




















0)   a] P(z,A,z





with solution ci(z,A,a), a0
i(z,A,z0,a).
Denition 2. A recursive competitive equilibrium with complete markets, are value and policy
functions fvi,ci,a0
ig, pricing functions w,d,P and an aggregate law of motion G such that:
1. Given the pricing functions and the aggregate law of motion, the value functions fvig solve
the recursive problem of the households and fci,a0
ig are the associated policy functions.
2. Wages and dividends satisfy
w(z) = (1   )z and d(z) = z (A-4)
35When securities pay o only in specic states of the world, the household portfolio choice problem is relatively
simple. Solving the portfolio choice problem between bonds and stocks is much harder because the returns on the










0,Ai) = 1 8z
0 2 Z. (A-6)








0, i = 1,...,I   1. (A-7)
We now describe how we reconstruct returns and prices for conventional stocks and bonds,
given the prices of state-contingent shares, exploiting the equivalence between the two market
structures when the aggregate shock takes only two values. Let W(z,A) denote the value of the







In the presence of state-contingent shares, risk-free bonds and levered stocks are redundant assets,
but they can still be priced. We now compute these prices q(z,A) and p(z,A) as functions of
the state-contingent prices P(z,A,z0) and W(z,A). There are two ways of securing one unit of
the good unconditionally in the next period. One could either buy one unit of the risk free bond
at price q(z,A) or instead buy a bundle of state-contingent shares for each possible z0, setting
the state-specic quantity to 1=[W(z0,G(z,A,z0)) + z0] so as to ensure a gross payout of one in






W(z0,G(z,A,z0)) + z0. (A-9)
With the bond price in hand, the stock price can immediately be recovered from the condition
that the value of the unlevered rm (in the economy with state-contingent shares) must equal the
2value of levered stocks and risk free bonds:
p(z,A) = W(z,A)   q(z,A)B. (A-10)
B Computational Appendix
Even for a moderate number of generations the state space is large: N   2 continuous state
variables (plus z). Since we want to deal with big shocks local methods should be used with
caution. Consequently in the economies with either only one asset or exogenous portfolios, we
have used global methods based on sparse grids, as in Krueger and Kubler (2004, 2006) (see
section B.1 ). For the economies with portfolio choice, we have solved the equilibrium using
linear methods; (see Section B.2). Section B.3 discusses the accuracy of our solution algorithms,
especially the perhaps more suspect one based on linearization. As we document there, the ndings
when using linear methods for the exogenous portfolio economy do not dier noticeably from those
using global methods. Moreover, when we apply linear methods to the log case for which there
is a closed form solution, the approximated allocations almost completely coincide with the exact
ones.
B.1 Sparse Grid Approximations
Relative to the methods described in Krueger and Kubler (2004, 2006), there are two additional
complications in the present model. The rst is that, while the sparse grids used there are subsets of
(I  1) dimensional cubes, wealth shares used in this paper are dened on the (I  2) dimensional
simplex. We deal with this issue by dening the state space in levels of wealth rather than in
shares, and then we map a generation's level of wealth to a share when evaluating the Euler
equations. The second complication is that the prices of the assets cannot be read o of rst-
order conditions in this model (one can do this in production economies where factor prices equal
marginal productivities), but must instead adjust so that excess demand for stocks and bonds is
jointly zero. We therefore use an algorithm that nests an outer and an inner loop. In the outer
loop we iterate over prices, and in the inner loop we iterate over policies. Specically, we use the
following algorithm to solve for the equilibrium in the single-asset economy and the xed portfolio,
two-asset economy:
1 Solve for the steady state prices and wealth levels: p,q,W = (W 2,W 3,...,W I 1,W I). As
3described above we work with an endogenous state space of dimension I   1 rather than
I   2, and then map wealth levels into wealth shares.
2 Create a sparse grid around the steady state wealth distribution. Call this grid W. We verify
that the hyper-cube dened by the bounds of the grid contains the ergodic set of wealth
levels.
3 We start with the outer loop over prices (this loop was unnecessary in Krueger and Kubler
(2004)). At an outer loop iteration n we have guesses from the previous iteration for Cheby-
shev coecients for prices, (p,n
z ,q,n
z ), which are used to compute the values of prices (p,q)
for each realization of z and each point W 2 W in the endogenous state space. We denote




z,W)W2W. The Chebyshev coecients (p,n
z ,q,n
z ) also
determine the pricing function on the entire state space, denoted by (b  
p,n




4 Given approximate price functions in the inner loop we iterate over household policies. In this
loop we generate both the savings policy and the law of motion for the wealth distribution
consistent with approximate price functions (b  
p,n
z , b  
q,n
z ). The savings policy is indexed by
generation and current state z, and so the current guess of the savings policy function at
policy iteration m when the price iteration is n is determined by Chebyshev coecients of
the form (
y,n,m
z,i ). These can be used to compute the optimal savings level at grid point W
and is denoted by ( 
y,n,m
z,i,W). As in the previous step the Chebyshev coecients also determine
the entire approximating savings functions (b  
y,n,m
z,i ). The law of motion for wealth is a
function of savings, current prices, and future prices; it must therefore be indexed by current
state z, generation i, and future state z0. Similarly, the Chebyshev coecients (
G,n,m
z,i,z0 ) are
used to compute the law of motion ( 
G,n,m
z,i,z0,W) for all points W 2 W and to generate the
approximating functions b  
G,n,m
z,i,z0 .
5 At this point we loop over each value of z and each point in W 2 W and solve the I   1
Euler equations for the I   1 savings, yi,z,W. The Euler equations that we solve to generate
the updated savings are:
u







36Note that this notation implies b  
p,n



















































































c1(y1,z;W,z) = (1   )z1(z)   y1,z,W
for i = 1,...,I   1 :











for i = 1,...,I   2 :
b ci+1(W+(z
0),z
0n,m) = (1   )zi+1(z
0) + W+,i+1(z






0n,m) = (1   )zI(z
0) + W+,I(z
0).
Note that in the calculation of the ci's we switch from using wealth levels to using wealth
shares to satisfy the requirement that only the latter are truly minimal state variables. This
is another dierence with the previous use of Smolyak polynomials in Krueger and Kubler
(2004).
With the new savings in hand, we update the savings policies as  
y,n,m+1
z,i,W = yi,z,W and the



























6 If maxW2W maxz maxz0 maxi j 
y,n,m+1
z,i,W    
y,n,m
z,i,Wj is below an acceptable tolerance level then
we proceed to step [7]. Otherwise we return to [4] with the updated savings functions and
aggregate law of motion for wealth denoted by m+1 above. We now generate new Chebyshev
coecients 
y,n,m+1
z,i by solving the system b  
y,n,m+1
z,i (W) =  
y,n,m+1
z,i,W for each W 2 W.



































i=1(1   i) 
y,n,m+1
z,i,W =B and return to step [3].




z,i by solving b  
p,n+1
z (W) =  
p,n+1
z,W
and b  
q,n+1
z (W) =  
q,n+1
z,W for each value of z and each W 2 W.
B.2 Linearization
In the endogenous portfolios economy we look for ane functions37 for state contingent laws of
motion of wealth shares, HG, and prices, Hp, that approximate the equilibrium functions p and
G. Letting i stand for a generation, j stand for the index of the current state, and k stand for
the index of the contingency state for the following period, the desired output of the algorithm are
pricing and policy functions of the form
H
G


















where Ai+1,k and pjk are the steady state wealth shares and asset prices respectively (asset prices
in steady state are just the conditional probabilities).
We write these functions succinctly in matrix notation. We stack policies rst by generation,
then by contingency state, then by current state. Letting ~ A be the vector of wealth shares and J
37Note that, because we have a Markov chain, the functions are ane and not log-linear as is typical in the
literature that uses AR(1) processes.
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The method of solving for these coecients amounts to proposing an iterative procedure from
the future to the present as is standard going from fGn,png assumed to be the relevant laws of
motion tomorrow and then linearizing the Euler equations and market clearing conditions in order






















where D is a (J J I)(J J I) matrix, C is a vector, and B is a (J J I)I  1 matrix,
7all of which depend on the current guesses for coecients and the gradient of the Euler equation


















What is left to describe is how to generate the matrices D(n) and B(n), as well as the vector
C(n). Recall that for each generation i = 1,...,I   1 and each current shock zj, we have J











This system gives a total of (I   1)  J  J conditions for any wealth distribution A. In addition




For each shock zj we compute the steady state price in an economy where total factor productivity
is constant at that level zj, call it pj and let pj,k = pj jk. The steady state wealth distribution is
then Aj = (A2,j...AI,j).38 We linearize around these steady states by writing each Euler equation as
a function of the agent's own wealth share and the share prices a, ~ p = (p1,...,pJ), ~ a0 = (a0
1,...,a0
J),
~ p0 = (p0
1,...,p0
J), and ~ a00 = (a00
1,...,a00
J). This gives:


















































38Note that in the economy where the labor eciency units depend on the aggregate shocks, the implied steady
state wealth shares are dierent.
8Combine steady state arguments for the  function via:
xi,j,k = [Aij,(pj1,...,pjJ),(Ai+1,1,...,Ai+1,J),(pk1,...,pkJ),(Ai+2,1,...,Ai+1,J)]
Then the linearized Euler equation for generation i, when the current shock is zj and next period's
shock is zk, is:
0 = ijk(xijk) +
@ijk
@a




























We now impose the representative agent condition, ai = Ai, and we evaluate each of these Euler
equations at an aggregate wealth distribution A = (A2,...,AI) using linearized equilibrium policy
functions and prices fHG,Hpg. We obtain:
0 = ijk(xijk) +
@ijk
@a

































jk(A)]   Ai+2,`). (A-12)





ijk(A)   Ai+1,k] = 0 (A-13)
Now we use these equations to dene an iterative procedure using the linearized prices and policies,
noting that the linearization of the Euler equations guarantees that, given a guess of coecients
dening prices and policies, the resulting updated prices and policies are also linear. The idea is to
iterate from the future to the present, in order to update prices and policies. Given current guesses
9HGn,Hpn we nd new guesses HGn+1,Hpn+1 by solving:
0 = ijk(xijk) +
@ijk
@a






























































ijk (A)   Ai+1,k

= 0. (A-15)
Implementing this algorithm involves stacking these equations into a system of the form in equa-
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and if l 6= k then E
n
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5
Notice that the market clearing condition has been included at the bottom of each system of Euler
equations, so that each of these matrices now has I rows rather than I   1 rows. We then stack
12by next period's aggregate TFP states. This gives:
0 =
2
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This system can be solved for new policies and prices. Noting that this expression has to hold for











This expression is exactly the form of the equation needed to update the policy and price coe-
cients. The equilibrium coecients are found by iterating on this procedure until convergence.
13B.3 Numerical Accuracy
The analytical results available for the endogenous portfolio and single-asset economies, for the
case when  = 1 and the age prole of earnings does not vary with z, provide us with a useful
test case to assess the numerical accuracy of our computational results. We now compare our
numerical results to the theoretical prediction from Proposition 1, item by item. We make the
following observations:
1 The distribution of wealth shares is constant along the simulation and is plotted in Figure
A-1.
2 The bond and stock prices are proportional to z. This is veried in Figure A-2, which simply
shows that in each state z the prices fall by exactly the same percentage as z for one period
and then return to their previous values. In terms of numbers,  p = p(z,  A)=z = 0.5167 and
 q = q(z,  A)=z = 0.6468 for all z 2 Z.
3 In the main text we displayed that portfolios were constant across age groups with  = 1.
That they are equal to
p
p+Bq can be veried from point [2] since
p
p+Bq = 0.9428, which is
exactly the value for the portfolio share i chosen by each household (see again the gure in
the main text). The portfolio shares are also constant over the simulation path, as is shown
in Figure A-3 and as predicted by Proposition 1.
4 The consumption proles, normalized by total output z along the simulation path are plotted
in Figure A-4. Note that they are independent of z, as the proposition indicates. They are
also equal to the theoretical consumption levels given in the proposition.
5 Verication of part [5] of the proposition is guaranteed since [2] holds.
6 The equity premium in theory is 0.16%, given our calibration. Along the simulation path,
the average equity premium is also exactly 0.16%.
When  = 1 and the earnings distribution is independent of z, the single-asset economy
generates allocations and dynamics that are identical to the endogenous portfolio economy. The
price and consumption dynamics can be seen in Figures A-5 and A-6; they are in fact identical to
the endogenous portfolio economy. The welfare losses are identical to the second decimal place,
as can be seen in the text, but for completeness this table is replicated here, with four decimal
places, as Table A-1.
14Table A-1: Expected Welfare Gains from One-Period Recession,  = 1
Generation 20   29 30   39 40   49 50   59 60   69 70+
Single Asset -1.6218 -2.0437 -2.4263 -3.5737 -5.3652 -8.3011
Endog. Port. -1.6218 -2.0446 -2.4272 -3.5738 -5.3643 -8.3000
C Proof of Proposition 1: Economy with Log-Utility and iid Shocks
We will verify that the conjectured expressions for prices and allocations satisfy households' budget




"i = 1, A1 = 0 and
I P
i=1
Ai = 1. It is then straightforward to verify that the expressions
in Proposition 1 for i(z,A,Ai), ci(z,A,Ai) and yi(z,A,Ai) satisfy the market clearing conditions
for goods, stocks, and bonds.
The next step is to verify that the conjectured decision rules ci(z,A,Ai) and yi(z,A,Ai) satisfy
the household budget constraints. Given identical portfolios, all households earn the return to
saving. Substituting in the candidate expressions for prices and portfolio shares, the gross return











z (p +  + qB)
z 1 (p + qB)
.
Given this expression for returns, consumption for a household of age i is
ci(z,A) = (1   )"iz + yi 1(z 1,A)

z (p +  + qB)
z 1 (p + qB)

  yi(z,A).
Substituting in the candidate expression for yi(z,A) gives
ci(z,A) = z








which is the conjectured expression for equilibrium consumption (Property 4).
The nal condition to verify is that agents' intertemporal rst-order conditions with respect to




















8i = 1,...,I   1.





[z0p + z0   B + z0qB]























Note from these rst order conditions that the conjectured expressions for p(z,A) and q(z,A)
cannot be valid for shocks that are not iid over time, because absent iid shocks, the right-hand
sides of (A-16) and (A-17) would be functions of z.
Adding the two rst-order conditions for stocks and bonds gives
p + qB = i+1(A)(p + qB + ) 8i = 1,...,I   1. (A-18)
This is the rst-order condition for pricing claims to capital for a non-stochastic life-cycle
economy, in which the constant asset price is p+qB and the constant asset income is . The I  1
equations (A-18) combined with A1 = 0 and the market clearing condition
I P
i=1





i=1 and p + qB. This system of equations has a solution, because it denes a
standard non-stochastic general-equilibrium life-cycle economy. Property 5 in Proposition 1 follows
from that fact that z does not appear anywhere in this system of equations, and the only place B





i=1 and p+qB the only remaining relative price still to be determined is the relative
16price of stocks and bonds. We need to verify that there exists a ratio p=q which supports the
conjectured portfolio split  for each age group. From equations (A-16) and (A-17) the relative
valuation of stocks and bonds is equal across age groups. Specically (and now using the iid











which is independent of age group i. This reects the fact that consumption of all age groups is
equally sensitive to aggregate productivity, and thus (given common constant relative risk aversion)
all age groups require the same equity premium to support the conjectured (symmetric) portfolios.
When the value of aggregate wealth is given by (A-18) and the ratio of stock to bond prices
by (A-19), all agents' rst-order conditions are satised.
















The expression for the equity premium in Proposition 1 (Property 6) follows from substituting the
denition for dividends into the rst term, substituting the expression for q(z,A) in equation (A-19)
into the denominator of the second term, and then replacing all remaining asset prices with the
corresponding price expressions in Property 2.
D Asset Prices in the Representative Agent Economy
Suppose the representative agent invests an exogenous fraction  of savings in stocks and fraction
1  in bonds. Let c(z,a) and y(z,a) denote optimal consumption and savings as functions of the
aggregate shock z and individual start-of-period wealth a, and let p(z) and q(z) be the equilibrium
prices for stocks and bonds. Note that there is no need to keep track of aggregate wealth as a
state: by assumption, the supply of capital is constant and equal to one. Thus prices can only
depend on z.












c + y = (1   )z + (p(z) + d(z) + B)a




0) + B] =








The solution to this problem yields decision rules c(z,a), y(z,a) and a0(z0,y(z,a)) is the associated
value for next period wealth.
Given the preferences and technology described above, the market clearing conditions are simply
y(z,1) = p(z),
(1   )y(z,1) = q(z)B,
c(z,1) = z.




Now suppose the process for z is a two-state Markov chain. There are just two equity prices to
solve for: p(z) 2 fp(zl),p(zh)g. The two market clearing conditions for stocks and bonds imply a





Thus stock and bond prices must be equally sensitive to aggregate shocks. The realized gross real










where the second equality follows from substituting in d(z0) = z0+q(z0)B B and the expression
for q(z).as a function of p(z). Thus the equilibrium equity prices are dened by the solutions to


















which, using the market clearing condition for consumption and the CRRA preference specication,
can be written as
p(zh)z
 
h =  h z
 
h [zh + p(zh)] + (1    h)z
 
l [zl + p(zl)],
p(zl)z
 
l =  l z
 
l [zl + p(zl)] + (1    l)z
 
h [zh + p(zh)].
where  h =  zh,zh and  l =  zl,zl. From the second pricing equation
p(zh) =

































Since the expression for p(zh) is symmetric, we can take the ratio to express the ratio of prices
















h + ( +  h    h    l)

.
Note that  and  have dropped out here: the ratio of stock prices across states does not depend
on either  or , though the levels of prices do. If aggregate shocks are iid, then 1    l =  h and









It is straightforward to verify that the same result is obtained even without the iid assumption in
19two special cases:  = 1 or  = 1.
E Asset Prices in the Two-Period Overlapping-Generations Economy
Let e p =
p(zh)
p(zl), e z =
zh
zl , and e x =
zl
pl. In terms of these variables, the intertemporal rst-order
conditions, conditional on the current state being zl and zh are, respectively:
((1   )e x   1)
  =  zl,zl (e x + 1)
1  +  zl,zh (e ze x + e p)
1 
e p ((1   )e ze x   e p)
  =  zh,zl (e x + 1)
1  +  zh,zh (e ze x + e p)
1 
Our goal is to solve for e p as a function of e z. However, except for the special case  = 1, this
system of equations cannot be solved in closed form. So instead we will linearize these equations
and look for an approximate solution for relative prices as a linear function of relative productivity.
We proceed as follows:
1. Take rst-order Taylor-series approximations to these two rst-order conditions around the
non-stochastic steady state values for e p, e z, and e x, which we denote P, Z, and X (where
Z = P = 1). This gives a system of two equations in three rst-order terms (e x   X),







(e x   X)
(e z   Z)










A11 =   ((1   )X   1)
  1 (1   )  
 
(1   ) zl,zl (X + 1)
   + (1   ) zl,zh (X + 1)
  

A12 =  (1   ) zl,zh (X + 1)
  X
A13 =  (1   ) zl,zh (X + 1)
 
A21 =   ((1   )X   1)
  1 (1   )  
 
(1   ) zh,zl (X + 1)
   + (1   ) zh,zh (X + 1)
  

A22 =   ((1   )X   1)
  1 (1   )X   (1   ) zh,zh (X + 1)
  X
A23 =  ((1   )X   1)
  1 + ((1   )X   P)
    (1   ) zH,zH (X + 1)
 
202. Use the rst equation in A-20 to solve for (e x   X) as a linear function of (e z   Z) and
(e p   P) :
(e x   X) =  
A12
A11
(e z   Z)  
A13
A11
(e p   P).
Then substitute this solution into the second equation in (A-20), and solve for (e p   P) as a
function of (e z   Z) :
(e p   P) =  
A21
A23
(e x   X)  
A22
A23








(e z   Z)  
A13
A11









e p   P





3. Now assume productivity shocks are iid., so that  zl,zh =  zh,zh =  zh and  zl,zl =  zh,zl =










((X   X   1) + )
Recall that X is the inverse of the steady state stock price, so we can equivalently write this








This is the expression given in the text. Note that for  = 1, 
2p = 1.
4. We want to show that 1 < 
2p < 
RA for  > 1. First, note that in any equilibrium, a




























2p = 1 when  = 1, showing that 











= (   1)(R   1)
R   R + 1
(R   R +    1)
2
It follows that 
2p is strictly increasing in  if and only if R > 1
1 . But in any equilibrium,
positive consumption for the young requires exactly this condition:
(1   )  

R   1
> 0 , R >
1
1   
We conclude that 
2p > 1.
5. In the special case in which  is such that R = 1
, the expression for 
2p simplies further. The
steady state value for R is an endogenous variable, and has to satisfy the steady state version



















When  = 1
R, equation A-22 can be solved in closed form to give R = 1
1 2. Thus we have
R = 1
 = 1
1 2 which implies  = 1
2(1   ). Substituting R = 1
 and  = 1












which is the expression for this special case given in footnote 16.
F Asset Prices in the Economy with Exogenous Portfolios
In this section we briey relate asset prices in the two-asset economy with exogenous portfolios to
the price of the stock in the one-asset (stock only) economy. We will use hats ^ to denote prices
in the two-asset economy to dierentiate these prices from those in the stock-only economy. First,
note that in the two-asset economy, if all age groups were to have the same exogenous portfolio
allocations, i = , then the two-asset and one-asset economy dier with respect to prices, but
are identical with respect to allocations. In particular, if i =  8i then:
221. Real allocations b ci(z,A,Ai) and b yi(z,A,Ai) in the two-asset economy are identical to those
in the one-asset economy, ci(z,A,Ai) and yi(z,A,Ai).
2. Equilibrium stock prices in the two-asset economy are proportional to those in the one-asset
economy:
b p(z,A) = p(z,A).






4. The conditional equity premium in the two-asset economy (conditional on the current ag-























5. The conditional equity premium is decreasing in B and .
The intuition for these results is straightforward. Property 1 reects the fact that when all
households must choose the same portfolio split, the partitioning of asset income into risky and
safe components is an articial veil that has no eect on equilibrium quantities. Property 2 follows
from the fact that aggregate savings are identical in the two-asset and one-asset economies, and
the fraction of savings exogenously devoted to equity is . Property 3 follows from the fact that
aggregate savings in the two-asset economy, b q(z,A)B + b p(z,A) equals aggregate savings p(z,A)
in the one-asset economy. Property 4 follows from substituting the expressions for b p(z,A) and
b q(z,A) and the denition for dividends b d(z,A) = z   B + b q(z,A)B into the denition of the
conditional equity premium. Note that in this expression for the equity premium, all the endogenous
price terms correspond to the one-asset economy and are thus independent of B and . Property
5 follows immediately.
Intuitively, more debt reduces bond prices and thus increases bond returns, and at the same
time more debt reduces levered stock returns. Increasing  has a similar eect: a smaller share of
23savings owing into bonds reduces bond prices and increases bond returns. In addition, a larger
 has the eect of raising stock prices and reducing stock returns, further reducing the equity
premium.
Now consider the general case, in which the exogenous portfolio shares i vary with age. This
will induce age variation in the returns to saving, and thus allocations will no longer coincide














The market clearing conditions for stocks and bonds are
b p(z,A) = b s(z,A)b Y(z,A),








This expression suggests that the relative price of stocks to bonds will vary with fig and B in
a similar to fashion to the case with age-independent portfolio shares. However, in contrast to the
economy with identical portfolio shares by age group, equilibrium prices cannot be readily related
to the stock price in the one-asset economy, and in general will depend on both B and the entire
distribution fig.
24G Additional Tables with Results






Economy  = 1  = 3  = 5
Single Asset 1.13 2.29 2.94
Fixed Portfoliios
{Stock 1.18 2.45 3.19
{Bond 0.86 2.52 3.53
{Wealth 1.15 2.46 3.21
Endogenous Portfolios
{Stock 1.07 2.98 5.00
{Bond 1.05 3.0 5.01
{Wealth 1.07 2.98 5.00
25Table A-3: Realized Welfare Gain from Recession (cyclical age-earnings prole)
Age i  = 1  = 3  = 5
Single-Asset Economy
1  10.06%  7.28%  6.30%
2  9.32%  7.48%  6.87%
3  8.06%  7.30%  7.06%
4  7.71%  8.67%  9.17%
5  6.89%  10.03%  11.61%
6  6.50%  11.34%  14.08%
Fixed Portfolio Economy
1  10.17%  7.65%  6.60%
2  9.57%  8.27%  7.77%
3  8.01%  7.31%  7.00%
4  7.43%  8.31%  8.76%
5  6.40%  9.48%  11.10%
6  5.38%  10.69%  13.57%
Endogenous Portfolio Economy
1  9.33%  6.25% 1.73%
2  8.57%  9.7%  9.82%
3  8.43%  8.66%  6.62%
4  7.58%  8.48%  9.15%
5  7.27%  8.19%  9.86%
6  7.65%  8.05%  9.73%















Figure A-1: Wealth Distribution Dynamics in Endogenous Portfolios Economy



















Figure A-2: Price Dynamics of Stock and Bond in Endogenous Portfolio Economy

















Figure A-3: Portfolio Dynamics in Endogenous Portfolio Economy












Figure A-4: Consumption Dynamics in Endogenous Portfolio Economy


















Figure A-5: Price Dynamics of Wealth in Single-Asset Economy












Figure A-6: Consumption Dynamics in Single-Asset Economy
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